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Abstract
We investigate the localization of technical knowledge in a setup where firms or
researchers compete for the value of a preemptive innovation. All researchers could gain
by sharing information due to the uncertainty of the arrival time of the discovery. As
receiving information while withholding expertise improves the competitive position of
the actor there is a short-run incentive not to cooperate. Informal trade of technical
know-how in a matching market is brought about by pre-trade communication on the
reputation of players and the refusal to disclose informtation to agents with a bad
reputation. This community enforcement results without the players following
contagious strategy profiles. If the communication on the reputation of players is
associated with costs depending on geographic distances, researchers have a strong
incentive to cluster in geographical space. The number and pattern of agglomerations
depends on the initial distribution of firms over geographical space and relocation costs.
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Introduction
This paper gives an explanation for the geographic concentration of innovative activities
which is based on the hypothesis that research firms or individual researchers seek
locations close to each other because proximity facilitates the exchange of technical
information. Empirical investigations (e. g. von Hippel 1987, Saxenian 1994) have
confirmed this hypothesis.
1 These empirical observations lead to two major questions:
- First, why should agents who dispose of proprietary knowledge of economic value
reveal such knowledge to competitors? Why should researchers believe than
informally traded information is reliable? The theoretical model on innovation races
(1972, Loury 1979, Lee and Wilde 1980, Reinganum 1989) predict, in complete
contrast to the above mentioned empirical studies that researchers will not cooperate,
neither by sharing information. The general non-cooperative behavior is seen as the
reason for an inefficient R&D sector at large, calling for corrective government action
(cf. Mortensen 1982 and Stewart 1983).
- A second major question is, why, given that researchers cooperate in research
activities, they benefit from locating close to each other. In view of the dramatic
increase of technical communication possibilities, it appears to be striking that
communication is facilitated to a significant degree by geographical proximity. Why
has the decrease of communication costs not led to a dissolution of geographic
clusters of innovative activities? The assertion that to convey technical information
requires face-to-face communication (v. Hippel 1988, Audretsch 1998,
Feldman/Audretsch 1999) entails the question why this sort of information cannot be
transferred via e-mail, facsimile or phone.
The consequences of the localized exchange of information have been investigated at
different levels of aggregation: at the industry level as localization effects (Marshall
1890, Arrow 1962), at the urban interindustry level as urbanization effects (Jacobs
                                               
1  A competing hypothesis of the localisation of technologies is based on labour
market pooling arguments (David and Rosenbloom 1990, Antonelli 1995). In this
literature there is, however, no explanation of why R&D staff should be particularly
immobile.3
1984), in the non-price interaction models of agglomeration (Papageorgiu/Thisse 1985,
Fujita/Ogawa 1982 and Imai 1982) and in relation to national endogenous growth (Lucas
1988. 1993, Dudley 1999).
In the second subsection we present in detail the model of technological competition.
Researchers compete for the value of an innovation that is completely protected against
imitation and duplication. As the research process is stochastic all researchers could gain
from coordination of strategies but are unable to ex ante commit to cooperation. In the
third subsection we first review the evidence of the behavior of researchers which is in
stark contrast to the results of the models of innovation races: Researchers do share
proprietary know-how which is relevant for the ongoing research process, without
having explicit contracts and without any accounting of the mutual support. Second we
develop a model on how networking between researchers to communicate past
experiences in bilateral information trades leads to a "community enforcement" of
cooperative behavior in a matching market for know-how. That is, there is no local
interaction which is established by the matching mechanism. The general cooperation is
shown for exogenously given networks of overlapping neighborhoods. We then
endogenize networks, assuming that bilateral network links are the more costly the larger
the geographic distance between any two potential network members. these networking
casts imply that networks locate at individual points in geographic space. Depending on
whether relocation costs of firms are distance dependent one or several centers of
specific research activities may form.
2 Competition and cooperation in R&D
The environment that is considered here is one in which a particular invention is sought
simultaneously by M identical potential inventors or firms (for other classes of models cf.
Reinganum 1989). The firm which succeeds in producing the invention first is awarded a
patent, which completely protects it from imitation or duplication. To take part in the
research activities a firm i incurs a fixed cost Fi and chooses a research intensity
measured by current expenditures xi measured in monetary units. Given sufficient time,
the research objectives will be realized but the expected time lag before discovery is a
negative function of the variable research expenditures.4
Let h = h(xi) be the instantaneous probability that a firm i makes the invention at any
point in time. h is assumed to be a positive function only of the research expenditures per
period x and does not vary over time. h(xi) is assumed to be strictly increasing and twice
differentiable. This implies that the random variable t indicating the time at which a firm
makes the discovery has an exponential distribution f(t) = he
-ht, so that the probability of
making a discovery prior to period t is Pr{t £ t} = 1-e
-ht, and the expected time of
discovery is Et = 1/h.
Let M denote the set of firms and h(xj) be the instantaneous probability that some
other firm j will be the winner of the innovation race, and assume that in the absence of
communication firms' research activities are independent of one another. In that case the
time at which any of the other firms makes the discovery also has an exponential






￿ ( ), i,j ˛ M. (1)
and the probability that one of the other firms will be successful prior to time t is Pr{t £
t} = 1 - e
-at. The discovery has an expected value of P, where P is the discounted worth
of the profit stream generated by the use of the innovation over time. i denotes the
common discount rate of all firms. Since the game is completely symmetric, the expected
payoff of taking part in the innovation race V to any one firm i is a function of its own
investment xi and the aggregate rival hazard rate a:
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, for all i ˛ M (2)
A best response function for firm i to the aggregate rival hazard rate a is a function
( ) $ x a  such that for all a  ( ) ( ) ( ) V x a a V x a
i i $ , , ‡  for all x. The symmetric Nash equilibrium
for a given number of firms M will be denoted x*(M) and satisfies the relation
( ) x x a * $ * = , where a* = (M-1)h(x*). Under "the stability condition" 1-(M-
1)h'(x*) $' x (a*) > 0, which avoids an equilibrium where firms stop doing research
altogether, Lee and Wilde (1980) have shown that a firm's equilibrium research5
expenditures are an increasing function of the number of firms. An increase in the
number of firms is associated with an earlier invention date on average as there are more
firms and each firm invests at a higher rate. The value of taking part in the innovation
race is a decreasing function of the number of competing firms. With free entry it
decreases until equilibrium expected profits are zero. Even with a fixed number of firms
each firms invests at a higher rate than is jointly optimal. Free entry results in too many
firms each having too high a level of research expenditures compared to a cooperative
solution.
If the social value of the invention is also P, then the comparison of the
noncooperative equilibrium and joint optimality are also applicable to the comparison
between noncooperative equilibrium and social optimality: The excessive investment in
research is the result of two forces. First, each firm wants to win the race, while society
typically has no preference as to the identity of the winner of the innovation race.
Second, because there is unrestricted access to the common pool of undiscovered
innovations, too many firms compete.
Mortensen (1982) and Stewart (1983) have discussed the normative question
whether a mechanism could be implemented to correct for the externalities associated
with the innovation race. A social optimum would be reached if the winning firm receives
the value P less a compensation paid to each losing firm which is equal to the foregone
value of continuing the research process. This institution induces noncooperative firms to
select the socially optimal R&D expenditure provided entry is restricted to the number of
firms in the unregulated noncooperative equilibrium.
The winning firm, receiving the capital value P must compensate the remaining M-1
firms paying P(1-s)/(M-1) each. Thus, the firm which wins the innovation race retains
the amount of sP. In this case, we can write the expected profit to firm i if it invests at
rate xi while the aggregate hazard rate is a as
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At a symmetric Nash equilibrium for this game, which is denoted by x*(M,s), the
following necessary optimality condition must hold:6
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Joint profits MV are maximized for x**(M) such that
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Thus, x* = x** if
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s*(M) is the winner's share which would induce noncooperative firms to invest at the
socially optimal level. However, since the compensation of losers raises the expected
profits of all firms relative to the noncooperative equilibrium it entails an incentive of
additional entry to that industry. Thus, the cooperating firms must also be protected from
further entry in order to fully internalize the externality associated with the innovation
race. This problem has given rise to doubts that members of an industry can credibly set
up such an institution for sharing the reward for innovation.
In what follows we interpret the winners share as an indicator of imperfect patent
protection due to communication among competing researchers or firms. That competing
firms network in their R&D activities is an often reported fact in the empirical literature.
This leads to the question why firms should exchange know-how, given that providing
information weakens the competitive position and receiving information strengthens it.
Short-run incentives should make the firms refuse to communicate. We discuss these
questions in the next subsection before asking how, given that direct communication is
associated with distance-related costs, networking provides an explanation for the
geographical clustering of innovating firms.
3 The informal trade of technical know how
Our concern here is to look for an explanation of the cooperation of firms in research
and development even in those cases where inventions could be perfectly protected.
Some of the empirical literature suggests that the cooperation is based on the informal7
sharing of information during the research process in networks between research
departments of firms (von Hippel 1987,1988; R. Allen 1983; T. Allen et al. 1983). As
von Hippel (1987, p. 292) notes:
"A firm's staff of engineers is responsible for obtaining or developing the
know-how its firm needs. When required know-how is not available in-
house, an engineer typically cannot find what he needs in publications either.
Much is very specialized and not published anywhere. He must either
develop it himself or learn what he needs to know by talking to other
specialists. Since in-house development can be time-consuming and
expensive, there can be a high incentive to seek the needed information from
professional colleagues. And often, logically enough, engineers in firms
which make similar products or use similar processes are the people most
likely to have that needed information. But are such colleagues willing to
reveal their proprietary know-how to employees of rival firms? Interestingly,
it appears that the answer is quite uniformly "yes" in at least one industry,
and quite probably in many."
He reports in his study of US steel minimill firms that there was no explicit accounting of
favors given and received but that the obligation to return a favor seemed to be strongly
felt by the recipient. The supply of information is restricted to the network, according to
the findings of von Hippel, in contrast to the interpretation of historical evidence by
Robert Allen (1983, p.2) that all competitors were given free access to proprietary
know-how.
In trying to explain the cooperation in R&D it was however only shown that there is
a prisoners' dilemma situation with potential gains from cooperation when the
competitive advantage of obtaining information and withholding the own know-how is
small relative to the payoff using the non-cooperative strategy (v. Hippel 1987, pp. 297-
300). It does not explain why the informal trade of know-how occurs. In fact, to
withhold information is a dominant strategy independent of the value of the competitive
advantage obtained by receiving information from a competitor and keeping the own
knowledge secret. In our attempt to explain the informal exchange of proprietary
technical knowledge we draw on the literature which gives reason to the cooperative
behavior of sellers who have private information on the product quality and nevertheless
refrain from providing low quality. "Community enforcement" provides a mechanism that
induces sellers to behave cooperatively even when they meet particular buyers only8
infrequently and have a short-term incentive to cheat (Klein and Leffler 1981, Okuno-
Fujiwara and Postlewaite 1995, Kandori 1992 and Milgrom et al. 1990).
Of partiular relevance is a class of models where players are unable to recognize
their opponents in a large but finite population setting. In these models sequential
equilibria have been shown to exist on the basis of contagious strategies: All players who
have been disappointed once stop cooperating with any of the potential opponents,
understanding that the whole society is in a process of switching to non-cooperative
behavior. In the sequential equilibrium the players stick to the cooperative strategy to
avoid the general switch to the socially negative behavior (Kandori 1992 and Ellison
1994). Community enforcement due to contagious strategies has the problematic
consequence that cooperation is unstable in the sense that a single defection would
render cooperation impossible for all other agents.
For the networking between the staff of the research and development departments
we need to consider an informal information transmission mechanism which is imperfect
in the sense that defection, withholding or giving incomplete or distorted information,
cannot be always punished immediately and that knowledge of the defection may only
spread to part of the population of players. To model this type of community
enforcement we draw on the model on word-of-mouth communication of Ahn and
Suominen (1996).
At discrete rounds r = 1,2,... two of the finite population of M researchers are
randomly matched to bilaterally exchange technical information which is of interest for
the common research objectives. The quality of the information provided is not
recognized immediately but becomes evident in the course of the ongoing research
activities. Both have a short term incentive to cheat: To withhold useful information
while the opponent reports truthfully leads to an increase of the individual's instantaneous
probability of making the discovery and avoids an enhancement of the imitation
possibilities of the competitors in case they loose the innovation race. As, however, the
opponents are able to detect useless or misleading information, private reputations
evolve. This follows from the fact that all participants send and receive signals on the
opponent's behavior in previous bilateral meetings to firms in their neighborhood forming9
a network. If these signals are correct, a sequential equilibrium exists where all members
of the research network report truthfully in every round.
More formally, members of a a finite set of players M ={1,2,...,M} trade know-how
bilaterally and send and receive signals on the reputation of other researchers. The
individuals are identified by their names.
An individual i ˛ M is randomly matched in round r with a player qr
-1(i) ˛ M to
play the following 2x2 information trade game on the position relative to taking part in
the innovation race, with g > 0 and 1+g-k < 2:
Table 1: Gains from the informal trade of know-how
Player i
disclose withhold
disclose    1,1 -k,(1+g)
Player j
withhold    (1+g),-k 0,0
If both players refuse to communicate there is no change compared to the situation of the
isolated innovation race. The change of the round value of continuing the innovation race
with mutual disclosure of information is equal to one. (1+g) is the value of continuing
one more round receiving information but without revealing the own know how and k
the loss resulting from revealing information while being cheated by the opponent. To
receive information while refusing to offer a return increases the player's instantaneous
probability of winning the innovation race and avoids increasing the re-engineering and
imitation possibilities of the competitors in case of being the winner. A researcher who
reports truthfully and is cheated weakens his position even relative to not communicating
at all, as the share of the capital value of the innovation is reduced when that researcher
wins the innovation race. Consequently, the strategy pair {withhold, withhold} is the
only Nash equilibrium of the one-shot trade game. Without any further information, both
parties would try to win the innovation race in isolation.
The overall payoffs are, however, the discounted sums of payoffs from the repetition
of the trade game. We assume that the individuals have a common discount factor d ˛10
(0,1). In each round r = 0,1,2,... there is preplay communication among the participants
before the next round of know-how trade takes place. More precisely, this preplay
communication proceeds as follows:
a. Each firm is member of a network A with A+1 members in its neighborhood. After
each round of matching Q each player i recognizes the identity of his own opponent
qr
-1(i) and the opponents qr
-1(n) of all members n ˛ A of the network. We assume
that the quality of the information provided is not publicly observable but is
discovered by the receiving party during the subsequent research process.
b. After the next round of matching and before the informal trading of know-how takes
place each player i sends a signal on the value of the report of qr
-1(n) in past rounds to
the A members of the network. Thus each player receives one or more messages on
the reputation of his current opponent if the latter is not unknown to all members of
the network.
Let C = {g,b} be the set of possible signals, g meaning "good" and b meaning "bad".
mr
i(n) is then the message of firm i to the other firms n of the network and mr(i) ˛
{g,b}
A is the tuple of messages player i receives.
c. The researchers who meet bilaterally play the above 2x2 simultaneous move game.
The quality of the information is denoted as ar(i) ˛ {g,b}. The total information player i
receives in each round can be written as {q
r, mr(i), ar(i)}. H
t(i) denotes the set of all
possible histories for a player up to but not including round r. By convention H
0(i) = ˘.
An element hr(i) ˛ H
t(i) includes the identity of all past matches, all past messages sent
by player i, all past messages received, and all observations of the quality of reports to
that date:
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The equilibrium concept we apply is the sequential equilibrium. A sequential
equilibrium requires that after any history a player's equilibrium strategy maximizes the
expected payoff, taken as given all other players' strategies and his beliefs about the
signals and actions taken by other players in all previous rounds. The beliefs have to be
consistent with the equilibrium strategy profile and the private history. One sequential
equilibrium is the refusal to provide know-how after any history. In what follows we are
interested in identifying a sequential equilibrium that supports a stable system of informal
trades of technical know-how.
The analysis concentrates on a particular strategy profile which is called
"unforgiving". With this strategy profile players meet and do trade information if they
have never experienced or heard of a bad behavior of the opponent. It requires them to
deliver truthful information in know-how trade in round zero and in every round
thereafter if a) they have always done so, and b) they have never obtained a bad status.
The concentration on the unforgiving strategy profiles can be justified by its
tractability and its being a non-contagious benchmark in that it provides the maximum
punishment.
Information about an agent's behavior may spread through personal experience and
the pretrade communication of the network members. The effectiveness of that spread
depends on the size of the network communicating on the opponents' past behavior. The
signals depend on the private histories of the agents who are members of the network.
Under the unforgiving behavior of the players, player i pursues the following strategy
profile in each round r = 0,1,2,... of bilateral encounters.12
a. In the first round disclose information truthfully. After that, if your opponent's past
behavior was cooperative, continue to report truthfully.
b. Withhold information otherwise.
c. If a player i has ever been cheated by the opponent qr
-1(n) of player n, i,n ˛ A, she
or he will signal b. Otherwise the signal is g. Upon receiving a bad signal player n
withholds information.
d. A researcher n cooperates otherwise.
In each round two types of incentive compatibility constraints have to be met: First
each agent must find it optimal to cooperate when everyone else is cooperating. Second,
each agent must find it optimal to play non-cooperatively, after having obtained a bad
status.
To keep a player reporting honestly in the bilateral encounters the gain per round
from cheating g must be outweighed by the long-term loss resulting from the spread of
the bad reputation among the fellow players. The spread of the bad reputation reduces
the probability of being matched with another player that does not know about the bad
status himself and belongs to a network of which no other member can report on a bad
experience. The second condition holds if a player who has once cheated cannot gain by
switching to cooperation to slow down or turn around the process of the spread of the
bad reputation.
3.1 Networks with exogenous connections
Contacts to other researchers or firms arrive according to a Poisson process with an
arrival rate such that there is exactly one encounter per round. The conditions for the
cooperative sequential equilibrium are then given in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1: Given an exogenous collection of overlapping networks of size A+1
whose members communicate on the reputation of opponents in a random matching
game of information trades, the strategy profile defined above is a sequential
equilibrium under the following conditions:13
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Proof: As stated above the sequential equilibrium of reporting honestly in bilateral
information trades depends on whether first, on the equilibrium path, it is profitable to
cooperate in all rounds r =0,1,2,3... Second, once a player has obtained a bad reputation,
it must be optimal to continue to behave non-cooperatively.
Cooperating when all other players follow the equilibrium strategy of cooperating
results in the payoff of 1 in each round. All agents assume an infinite sequence of
encounters and therefore have an infinite time horizon. All have a discount factor of d.










TC  is an increasing function of the discount factor.
If a player successfully cheats in all of the rounds r and the exogenous networks are all of



























, r = 0,1,2,... (13)
The nominator of br indicates the number of networks of size A+1 as subsets of the total
of all agents excluding the agent i and those who have been cheated before. The14
denominator indicates the number of networks which could be formed out of the set of
all researchers excluding researcher i.
After M-A-2 cases of receiving the payoff (1+g) any opponent will refuse to
cooperate and the firm is isolated. The total expected payoff of defecting permanently is
then



































TD is a decreasing function of the network size as the decrease of denominator is greater
than the decrease of the nominator with an increasing A and the number of rounds in
which (1 + g) can be realized decreases. It is an increasing function of the discount
factor.
Behaving cooperatively is a sequential equilibrium if
T T C D ‡ , or
( ) ( )
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with 2F1 denoting the hypergeometric function. The hypergeometric function is a
degressively increasing function of the network size.
Taking A to be a percentage x of M with x = i/M and i being non-negative integers
we obtain the expression SC as the netgain of cooperating
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SC is an increasing function of the discount factor as
( )















1 2 1 2 3 1 0 2 2 1 , ,2 , (17)
The condition for the net gain of cooperative behavior to be non-negative can be
expressed as a maximal value of g as a function of x and d. Solving equation (15) for g
we obtain15
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for d ˛ (0,1), and 0 £ x £ (M-A-2)/M.
For cooperation to be the social optimum and k being positive, g has to be larger
than one. From this follows the condition on the hypergeometric function
( ) ( ) ( )
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Next we identify the conditions under which an agent who has a bad reputation with
some of the M researchers will continue to behave non-cooperatively. Assume that K
players assign a bad status to researcher i. By the principle of dynamic programming it
suffices to check that a one-time switch to cooperative behavior is not profitable after
any history of having obtained a bad status.
Cooperating in round r with K players knowing about agent i's bad status and





























































































If player i instead continues to behave non-cooperatively in every round his total
expected payoff is
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If the sum of the latter three terms of the above right hand side are positive, TNC is
greater than TDEV as the first term is necessarily positive. From this follows an upper
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Taking the smallest possible k we obtain an expression for the upper bound of b0 that












In general, the second incentive compatibility constraint for the cooperative sequential
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g** is a decreasing function of S. S, in turn, is a decreasing function of K. To obtain a
sufficient condition for the existence of the sequential equilibrium we have to determine
the difference between g* and g** for the maximal K. The maximal possible K for which
a player with a bad reputation might check the usefulness of switching to cooperative






















As g** has to be larger than one and the denominator of the second term of the right
hand side is always negative d must be larger than one half. The smallest denominator,
and therefore the largest value for g** is obtained for the largest and the smallest
network size.
Taking both incentive compatibility constraints together we have
g g g ** * £ £ (27)
If a member j of the network of the opponent qr
-1(i) has been cheated by player i
before he cannot gain by giving the wrong signal g and should therefore signal the bad
reputation of player i. If he has been matched with player i before and received useful
information he should signal g. Otherwise i or qr
-1(i) would be perceived as having a bad
reputation and switch to non-cooperative behavior in future encounters under the
conditions given in proposition 1. If so, this would reduce the expected payoff of the
player who has given the wrong signal.
3.2 Networks with endogenous connections
We now relax the assumption that network links are exogeneously given. The costs of
maintaining a network link between researcher i and researcher j depend on its
geographical distance dij. The costs per unit of distance c are assumed to be constant.
The distance dependence of the costs of networking are considered to be due to the fact
that the communication on the reputation of competitors in the informal trade of know-
how requires confidential and personal contacts. The costs of such contacts decrease
with the geographical proximity of the agents. With each firm ordering the potential
network members according to the distances of the links the total costs of networking
per round of matching is










 denotes the closest network member and  j
-
 the most distant one. With a non-
uniform distribution of research firms over geographical space, the costs of networking
are the lower the higher the density of researchers in the neighborhood of an individual
firm.
Before examining the consequences of a non-uniform distribution of researchers over
space we have to check whether there is an incentive to network at all. If the surplus of
cooperative behavior is positive for a network size of zero firms would cooperate
without an incentive to network regardless of the density of competitors. If the network
size is zero the expression for the surplus of cooperating in all rounds reduces to































for d ˛ (0,1).
If the population size is larger than M* researchers have an incentive to network. For
a smaller population they would cooperate with all M*-1 competitors even without a
network.
To concentrate on the consequences of a non-uniform distribution of firms with fixed
locations we assume for a moment a special geographic configuration in that firms locate
around a circle and that all firms are double-indexed according to their location, the
index i running from 1 to M and M+1 to 2M. The network which firm i maintains is
denoted as Ai. We then have as the general expression for the surplus of cooperation in














































































































As the model is symmetric all network links will be reciprocal: If a firm i maintains a
network link to firm j, firm j will bear the costs of having a link to firm i. It then follows
directly from the above expression that a firm is the more prepared to cheat the larger its
own network, due to a high density of researchers in the neighborhood, and the more
dispersed the geographical distribution of the competitors. Firms will choose the minimal
network size that will prevent members of the largest network to cheat, if the surplus of
cooperative behavior in the repeated game is non-negative. Otherwise they will
participate in the innovation race in isolation, as long as its value is non-negative.
Unless all of the potential network members of firm i are located at a single point, Ci
is a progressively increasing function of the number of network members. The higher the
density of firms the larger will be the network at a given average cost of networking. The
larger the network the more the network members are protected against being cheated by
others.
3.2.1 Relocation of firms with fixed relocation costs
We now allow firms or researchers to relocate. For convenience we assume that an
arbitrary number of firms can locate at a single point in geographical space.
Proposition 2: With a non-uniform initial distribution of innovators over geographical
space and in the absence of relocation costs all firms will relocate to the point with the
highest initial density of researchers under the following conditions:
M* < M, (32)






Proof: To examine the relocation decisions of research firms we assume that the
intensity of the informal trading of know-how is no longer completely determined by the
exogenous matching mechanism but under the control of the researchers or firms. That
is, the intensity of information trading will be chosen such that the winner's share s of the
value of the innovation maximizes the firms' profits. From the first order condition of the












where x and h' have the values of joint optimality. Substituting for P from the first order
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, (35)
with all endogenous values evaluated at optimal levels of the industry equilibrium. As
was shown by Stewart (1983), expected profits are an increasing function of the number
of participants in the innovation race up to some M** and a decreasing function of M for
higher values. With free entry the number of participants will increase up to a point
where expected profit are equal to zero, unless we would introduce a mechanism which
allows firms at a single location to deter entry beyond a total number of researchers of
M**.
To show that there will be only one agglomeration of researchers assume to the
contrary that the geographic concentration of researchers occurs at two locations.
Assume further that the researchers at one location consider whether to differentiate with
respect to the intensity of information trading between the two locations. Following the
above argument on the optimal s, it can be shown that regardless of the relative sizes of
the two centers the optimal s is always smaller than one. That is, it is always optimal to
share information with all other researchers who have the same research interest..
This, in turn, requires that all researchers move to the same location: If firms
agglomerate at different points in geographical space without increasing the networking
costs, a system of non-overlapping networks emerges, as the researchers would confine21
networking to costless links at their own location. If so, the second incentive
compatibility constraint of the sequential cooperative equilibrium ceases to hold: It is
then possible to cheat all fellow researchers who are not member of one's own network
without running the risk of a spread of the bad reputation to all members of the
population. Therefore, the informal trade of technical know how will be confined to a
single location when there are no relocation costs.
All of them will network as there are no costs of networking. The condition for
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as a single defection becomes known to all members of the network. The defector
would then be isolated for all further rounds of matching and have no possibility to
switch to cooperative behavior. If the total number of researchers M exceeds M**, the
expected profits of firms will decrease. If there is no further entry to the industry firms
will enjoy positive profits due to the saving of the networking costs in the agglomerative
equilibrium.
3.2.2 Relocation of firms with distance dependent relocation costs
Assume now that there relocation costs which are linearly dependent on the distance of
relocation. Let the relocation costs per unit of distance be denoted by c*. We consider a
geographical configuration with a location Z being the point of the highest density of
researchers at the center of a circle with radius 2d:22




Let N1 firms be located in Zi and N2 firms within the circle around Zi with radius d. We
assume that for distances diZi < d between a firm i and the center Z the relocation costs
are smaller than the present value of the costs of maintaining the network at the initial










Proposition 3: With relocation costs c* per unit of distance, a center Zi with N1
innovators and N2 innovators within the circle around the center Zi with radius d, all N1
+ N2 firms will locate in the center Zi under the following conditions:
M* < N1 + N2 (38)
d = max diZi such that23
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Proof: We assume that N1 is larger than the minimum number of members of a network
which protects its members from being cheated. By the same arguments as those we put
forward to argue for a single agglomeration in the case without relocation costs, all of
the N2 firms will move to Zi. Outside the circle with radius 2d around Zi other
agglomerations of research firms may emerge. The set of agglomerations is then a
collection of disjoint networks. The networks being disjoint the second incentive
compatibility constraint of the cooperative sequential equilibrium is again violated. As a
consequence there will be no cooperation between researchers at different locations.
The expected profit function V' of an individual firm after relocation when there are
relocation costs reduces to
( ) ( ) [ ]
V
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The indices zi and zj now refer to agglomerations. All endogenous variables are
evaluated at the local symmetric equilibrium. Each firm optimizes research expenditures
sharing optimally technical know how with all researchers in the location Zi and taking
account of the rival hazard rates azj of other agglomerations Zj. All firms around Z within
the radius d which can cover the fixed costs of participating in the innovation race and
the relocation costs will move to the center. For these firms equation (39) must hold.
The radius d in Figure 3 is defined by the maximal value of diZ for which the equality sign
holds in equation (39).
4 Conclusions
We have studied the clustering of researchers or research firms in geographical space to
facilitate the beneficial sharing of information in the course of the research process. The
inability to commit to the truthful revelation of proprietary know-how is overcome by24
local networking of researchers. The networks serve to communicate on the reputation
of potential partners of cooperation. We identify the conditions under which such a
networking leads to a general cooperation among researchers. If the costs of maintaining
network links depend on the distances between the locations of any two researchers  the
localisation of specialised technical knowledge results. Depending on whether relocation
costs are distance dependent one or more centers of technical know how will form.
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